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Student Notes 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-FRAUD IN PROCUREMENT 
OF PERSONAL SERVICE-DIVORCE-DOMICILE 
If some future savant should perchance decipher the remains 
of any law review, he is almost certain to discover an article on 
full faith and credit,1 migratory divorce, and sundry allied prob-
lems of jurisdiction, domicile, service of process, and res judicata. 
If this explorer is statistically minded he may determine how-
much ink, paper, and time had been devoted to this subject. Cur-
iously, no volume dealing exclusively with the subject has been 
compiled.2 
This inquiry is but another attempt to state what part of the 
law in this area may be at the present time with particular ref er-
ence to a recent Nebraska case, Zenker v. zenker,3 which raises 
some interesting questions regarding the never, never land of full 
faith and credit. 
If married persons always had a common domicile there 
would be far less difficulty in determining which court has the 
power to grant a divorce entitled to recognition in sister states. 
But since husbands and wives in the United States may secure 
separate domiciles quite freely, the jurisdictional problem becomes 
one of great complexity. In Haddock v. Haddock,4 decided in 
1906, the United States Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce 
decree was entitled to full faith and credit when (1) it was grant-
ed, even though ex parte, at the matrimonial domicile; (2) when 
it was granted by the state which is the domicile of both spouses ; 
or (3) when the granting state was the domicile of one of the 
spouses and the other was served with process there or appeared. 
Thirty-six years later this doctrine was overruled, with the hold-
ing that the domicile of one party was sufficient jurisdiction for 
the action.5 That under certain circumstances the question of 
domicile could be re-examined by the courts of a state other than 
1 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
2 See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit 4 (1945). Research by the au-
thor disclosed no such volume as of this writing. 
3161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955). 
4 201 U.S. 562 (19-06). For early history of domicile in the United 
States, see Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 124 (U.S. 1869); Harding v. 
Alden, 9 Greenl. 140 (Me. 1832); Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407 (Ind. 
1831). 
u Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
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the one granting the divorce has been held in two subsequent 
cases.6 
However, it appears that this right to re-examine is limited 
and that a state's finding of domicile cannot be questioned where 
the defendant entered an appearance and appeared personally at 
the trial, 7 or possibly where the defendant was persona11y served 
in the state granting the divorce.8 Another facet of the problem 
was considered in Alton v. Alton9 where a court of appeals decided 
that a Virgin Islands statute providing that six weeks presence 
should be prima facie evidence of domicile was unconstitutional.1° 
The jurisdictional problems in divorce litigation become in-
creasingly frequent as our population becomes more ambulatory, 
and as a consequence, clashes with the full faith and credit clause 
and its implementing statute become more frequent.11 
Literal interpretation of the full faith and credit clause and 
its supporting legislation would mean that one state court could 
not question the judgment of another state court. It is obvious 
that literal interpretation has not been the rule. For a good many 
years it has been permissible for the courts of one state to ref use 
full faith and credit to judgments of courts of other states where 
the latter lacked jurisdiction.12 
6 Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina. 325 
u.s. 226 (1945). 
7 Coe v. Coe. 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 
(1948). 
ssee .Johnson v. l\!uelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951). 
9 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). 
10 121 F. Supp. 878 (D.V.I. 1953). The defendant-husband, domiciled 
in Connecticut, appeared generally, waived service of summons and did 
not contest the Virgin Island proceedings. The district court requested 
the plaintiff-wife to furnish evidence of domicile and when it was 'not 
forthcoming, dismissed the suit. The court of appeals held that the domi-
cile of at least one of the parties was necessary to satisfy constitutional 
requirements and could not be declared indispensable by statute. On writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 347 U.S. 610 (1954), 
the case was held moot because prior to the hearing, l\!r. Alton, defendant 
in the Virgin Islands' action, obtained a divorce in Connecticut. 
nsee .Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 93 (1827), now 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1948): 
"Such .Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authen-
ticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Posession from which they 
are taken." 
12 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 u.s. 32 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 (1874); Nelson v. Miller, 201 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1952); Ulrey 
v. Ulrey, 231 Ind. 63, 106 N.E.2d 793 (1952). But see Smith v. Smith, 
211 Ga. 615, 87 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1955). 
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Whenever judgments or decrees rendered by a state in a 
divorce suit are brought into the courts of a sister state for en-
forcement, it is quite likely two problems will be presented: (1) 
Is the divorce decree valid in the sister state?; and (2) Must the 
sister state enforce that part of the decree which grants money 
in the form of a property settlement or alimony. 
At least one, and possibly both, of these issues confronted the 
Nebraska court in the Zenker case. 
The wife commenced an action for divorce in the appropriate 
Colorado court. Her petition asked for a divorce and a division 
of the marital property. Personal service was had upon the de-
fendant-husband in Colorado, although as will be seen later there 
was doubt about whether this service was effective to give Colo-
rado personal jurisdiction over him since his presence in Colorado 
was allegedly procured by the fraud of the plaintiff-wife. The 
husband entered no appearance and took no part in the Colorado 
proceedings which were concluded when the Colorado court en-
tered a divorce decree and a judgment in the amount of $15,-
669.20 in favor of the wife. 
The wife next instituted a proceeding in an appropriate Ne-
braska court in which she asked that the Colorado judgment" .. . 
be declared to be valid and a lien on defendant's property .... "13 
The defendant-husband answered that the wife was not domiciled 
in Colorado; that instead she was domiciled in Nebraska; that 
Colorado had no jurisdiction to grant the divorce decree; that the 
husband's presence in Colorado at the time of the personal service 
was fraudulently obtained by the wife; and that therefore there 
was no jurisdiction to enter the money judgment which the wife 
sought to register. The husband prayed that the Nebraska court 
deny registration. The wife's reply alleged that the husband was 
estopped from challenging collaterally the jurisdiction of the 
Colorado court. 
The Nebraska trial court found that the Colorado court did 
not have jurisdiction to grant the divorce and the money judgment 
and dismissed the action. It found that the wife was not domiciled 
in Colorado. Because the wife's attorney did not file the proper 
papers within the time allotted by Nebraska procedural rules, the 
evidence bearing upon the domicile of the wife was not before 
the Nebraska Supreme Court. Consequently, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court treated the case upon the basis that it was an estab-
13 161 Neb. 200, 203-4, 72 N.W.2d 809, 813 (1955). 
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lished fact that the wife's domicile was not in Colorado, but in-
stead was in Nebraska. 
The supreme court agreed with the lower Nebraska court that 
registration of the Colorado judgment was properly refused. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court treated the validity of the property 
judgment as dependent upon the validity of the divorce decree, 
and held the latter invalid because it was rendered by a state which 
was not the domicile of either spouse, and which had not secured 
valid personal jurisdiction over the husband.14 The court held 
that service upon a person while he was within the state could 
not be made the basis of jurisdiction over the person served, 
where presence was the result of "fraud" of the judgment creditor. 
Had there been no fraud in obtaining personal service upon 
the defendant-husband in Colorado, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
indicated that it would have felt compelled by decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court to recognize the Colorado divorce 
decree, and probably also the Colorado judgment. The question 
which immediately arises is whether the Nebraska court elicited 
the correct rule for divorce jurisdiction from the United States 
Supreme Court cases and if so, does this rule bring us to that 
advanced state of civilization which permits a transitory divorce 
action, i. e., is domicile of one of the parties no longer necessary 
as the jurisdictional basis for granting a divorce? 
There can be no doubt that the Nebraska Supreme Court 
did find language in prior United States Supreme Court opinions 
to support the view that a state which is not the domicile of either 
spouse may grant a valid divorce if it obtains personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.15 Whether or not the United States Su-
preme Court intended to lay down this rule is debatable since such 
a holding carries far reaching consequences. Carried to its logi-
cal conclusion it would result in "mail order" or "vending ma-
chine" divorces.16 
The general rule is that jurisdiction based upon personal serv-
ice of process procured by fraud, trickery or artifice will not be 
exercised by a court, and that such service will be set aside upon 
14 Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-341 (1943). "A divorce from the bonds of 
matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect 
in this state, if both parties were domiciled in this state at the time the 
proceedings for divorce was commenced." 
15 See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 127 (1951). 
16 Cf. Brief of Dean Erwin Griswold for Amicus Curiae, p. 31-33, Gran-
ville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); see Rheinstein, The 
Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1955). 
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proper application. Relief is accorded in these cases, not because 
the court obtained no jurisdiction, but because the court will not 
exercise its jurisdiction to aid one who has obtained service of 
summons by unlawful means.17 The Restatement of Conflicts pro-
vides: 
Non-resident brought into 8tate by fraud or to participate 
in judicial proceeding. At common law a state does not in civil 
cases exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident brought into the 
state by the fraud of the plaintiff . . . A state has jurisdiction 
over such an individual but by the common law rule it does not 
exercise such jurisdiction. If, pursuant to a statute or otherwise, 
a state does exercise through its courts jurisdiction over such an 
individual, the action will be recognized as valid by the courts of 
other states . . . .18 
The Restatement rule seems to answer the question of what 
happens if the court exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding the 
personal service by fraud. Apparently a judgment so acquired is 
entitled to full faith and credit. Whether a state has furisdiction 
over a non-resident brought into the state by unlawful force is 
left open by the Restatement.19 
No decision involving the effect of fraud upon personal serv-
ice has been rendered by the United States Supreme Court since 
Jaster v. Currie.20 In that case plaintiff, a judgment creditor, re-
quested Nebraska to enforce a judgment recovered against de-
fendant in Ohio. Previously to the Ohio suit plaintiff had brought 
an action in Nebraska on the same cause, and served notice upon 
defendant's attorney that plaintiff's deposition would be taken in 
Ohio for use in the Nebraska action. Defendant was advised by 
his attorney to be present in Ohio when the deposition was taken. 
Defendant went to Ohio for that purpose and while there was 
personally served. Plaintiff then recovered the judgment in Ohio 
which }).e asked Nebraska to enforce. The defendant alleged fraud 
in procurement of the personal service in Ohio. Plaintiff de-
murred, and the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the over-
ruling of this demurrer.21 This action was reversed by the United 
States Supreme Court when it held Nebraska was required to · 
give full faith and credit to the Ohio judgment. 
17 See 42 Am. Jur., Process § 35 (1939); Patino v. Patino, 283 App. 
Div. 630, 129 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1st Dep't 1954), appeal denied, 283 App. Div. 
1029, 131 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1954); Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 
Pa. 326, 74 A.2d 142 (1950); Lloyd v. Thomas, 60 Pa. D & C 516 (1947). 
1SRestatement, Conflicts§ 78(d) (1934). 
19 Restatement, Conflicts § 78(e) (1934). 
20198 U.S. 144 (1905). 
21 Jaster v. Currie, 69 Neb. 4, 94 N.W. 995 (1903). 
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court: 
It will be observed that there was no misrepresentation, ex-
press or implied, with regard to anything, even the motives of 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not say or imply that he had one 
motive rather than another. He simply did a lawful act by all 
the powers enabling him to do it, and that was all. Therefore 
the word fraud may be discarded as inappropriate. The question 
is whether the service of a writ, otherwise lawful, becomes un-
lawful because the hope for a chance to make it was the sole 
motive for other acts tending to create the chance, which other 
acts would themselves have been lawful but for that hope. . . . 
It is hard to exhaust the possibilities of a general proposition. 
Therefore it may be dangerous to say that doing an act lawful in 
itself cannot make a wrong by the combination. It is enough to 
say that it does not usually have the result, and that the case at 
bar is not an exception to the general rule. We must take the 
allegations of the answer to be true, although they are mainfestly 
absurd. The plaintiff could not have known that the defendant's 
lawyer would advise him to go to Ohio, and the defendant would 
go to his father's house. instead of to Nebraska, when his business 
was over. But we assume, as far as possible, that the anticipa-
tion of these things was the sole inducement for giving the notice 
and taking the deposition. Still the notice was true, and the 
taking of the deposition needed no justification. It could be taken 
arbitrarily, because the plaintiff chose. On the other hand, the 
defendant could be served with process if he saw fit to linger in 
Ohio. That also the plaintiff could do arbitrarily, because he 
chose, if he thought he had a case.22 
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It is difficult to know how much weight should be given the 
statement concerning the defendant's lingering stay in Ohio, but 
it seems that Mr. Justice Holmes held that if there was a legiti-
mate reason for the defendant to be in Ohio, i.e., the deposition 
taking, the fact that the plaintiff, in serving notice that a de-
position would be taken, may have been motivated by the hope 
and desire to serve process on the defendant in Ohio, and in fact 
did cause the service to be made, will not render a judgment based 
upon such service subject to attack. This is evident from the last 
sentence of the opinion: 
He arbitrarily could unite the two acts, and do the first be-
cause he hoped it would give him a chance to do the last.23 
The Zenker case involved a fraud similar to that in the Jaster 
case. The allegation of the husband was that the wife induced 
22198 U.S. 144, 147-8 (1905). 
23 Actually, the underlying philosophy of what Mr. Justice Holmes said 
here was epitomized in a later opinion where he said: "The foundation 
of jurisdiction is physical power .... " McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 
91 (1917). 
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him to come to Colorado by indicating she was ready to sell some 
jointly owned property in Denver.24 The analogy is close although 
the two cases might be distinguished on the ground that in Jaster 
the deposition was actually taken while in Zenker the property 
was not sold-because, according to the husband's testimony, the 
wife refused to consider the sale.25 
The cases are strikingly similar as to the facts accepted by 
the courts. In the Jaster case the plaintiff's demurrer to the al-
legation admitted the existence of "fraud" and in the Zenker case, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court was forced to accept defendant's 
allegations of fraud in the pleadings.26 
If the evidence bearing upon the question of fraud had been 
presented to the Nebraska Supreme Court, it would have been 
squarely faced with the task of distinguishing the Zenker case from 
the Jaster case. 
If the wife did "entice" the defendant into Colorado, the ques-
tion is whether the lawful act of the wife in connection with the 
sale of the property became unlawful, or fraudulent, when con-
nected with the lawful act of serving process, on the ground that 
at least one of her motives in getting the husband to come to 
Colorado was to serve him with process in the divorce action. If 
there had been no property sale involved and the wife had en-
ticed the husband to Colorado by a promise of an attempted re-
conciliation, a promise which the wife had no intention to keep 
at the time it was made, the negative inference from Mr. Justice 
Holmes' opinion is that the service would be invalid.27 If in the 
Zenker case the wife did subjectively intend to discuss the sale 
of property in good faith, and the husband came into Colorado 
in response to such an invitation, did the Nebraska court fail to 
apply the test laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes? If the wife had 
24 The Bill of Exceptions, which contains the testimony in the case, 
reveals a paucity of evidence on this point. The husband testified that his 
employer in Denver wanted to buy the property and apparently the only 
testimony as to why defendant went to Denver was his own statement: 
"Yes, he [presumably his employer] called me up and said they [presum-
ably plaintiff] were ready to take [sic] it over." It should be noted that 
the employer referred to is not alleged in any manner to be a party to the 
alleged fraud. 
25 Cf. Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mill, 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940); 
Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Iams v. Tedlock, 110 
Kan. 510, 204 Pac. 537 (1922). 
26 The testimony on the issue of fraud was not properly before the Ne-
braska Supreme Court because of the failure to follow Nebraska pro-
cedural rules. 
27Cf. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937). 
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a good faith intention to discuss with the husband the possibility 
of a sale of marital property when she communicated with the 
husband, would her change of mind before the process was served 
take the service outside of the limits defined by Mr. Justice 
Holmes? 
It is submitted that if the Nebraska Supreme Court had been 
permitted to examine the testimony in this case, and had strictly 
followed the Jaster case, it would have been e)...-tremely difficult 
to find Colorado lacked personal jurisdiction over the husband 
for there seems to be no evidence of fraud which was not covered 
by Mr. Justice Holmes' test. But there are cases that support 
a contrary result.2s 
The Zenker case presents other difficult problems. Let us sup-
pose that A brings an ordinary tort action against B in state X 
and B enters a special appearance to contest the court's jurisdic-
tion over him. Suppose further that in a contested proceeding the 
court finds that it has jurisdiction over B's person, and that B 
withdraws, takes no further part in the proceedings, and a per-
sonal judgment in A's favor is entered by default. If A later sues 
on the judgment in state Y and B attempts to defend upon the 
ground that state X had no jurisdiction over him we know that 
he cannot do so-state Y must give full faith and credit to the 
judgment because the finding of jurisdiction by state X is i·es 
judicata.29 B had his day in court on the matter of jurisdiction. 
This res judicata effect has been extended to include cases where 
the defendant did not litigate the question of jurisdiction but had 
opportunity to do so.3o 
In the zenker case, Mr. Zenker, the defendant, was personally 
served in Colorado. If we assume that that service was fraudu-
lent, and further assume that it was the type of fraud that would 
vitiate the Colorado personal service, can it be argued that Mr. 
Zenker was in Colorado and had an opportunity to litigate the 
effect of that fraud and Colorado's power to render a binding 
personal judgment? Is this case different from one in which 
28 See Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 124 Fed. 
259 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1903); Peel v. January, 45 Ark. 331 (1880). 
29 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Baldwin v. 
Iowa State Traveling l\Ien's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Chicago Sun Life 
Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917); cf. Treines v. Sunshine l\Iining 
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). 
30 Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941); Chico County 
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); see also York 
v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), where a Texas statute converted a special 
appearance to a general one. 
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the defendant makes a special appearance? Can it be said that 
personal service on Mr. Zenker in Colorado gave Colorado power 
to decide both whether it had jurisdiction over Mr. Zenker and 
whether Mrs. Zenker was domiciled in Colorado, and that Mr. 
Zenker is bound because he could have litigated in Colorado the 
issues of fraud and domicile? 
The factual difference between a case of fraudulent service 
and a special appearance is that in the latter the court's power to 
decide the question of jurisdiction stems from a voluntary act of 
the one appearing specially.31 
However, Mr. Zenker's trip to Colorado, even if fraudulently 
induced, was voluntary, and this case raises the question of the 
effect of this fraud upon Mr. Zenker's opportunity to litigate in 
Colorado the validity of that state's assumption of personal juris-
diction over him. A clear cut ruling on this particular question 
has never been given by the United States Supreme Court. If 
we accept Mr. Justice Holmes' theory that the underlying basis 
of jurisdiction is the existence of power in a state to seize and 
hold the body of the defendant,32 it would seem that Colorado had 
power to seize Mr. Zenker when he came to Denver to talk to his 
wife about selling some marital property, and that this power at 
least gave Colorado jurisdiction to make a decision as to the ef-
fect of that fraud, a decision that would be binding on other states 
under the full faith and credit clause. This would appear to be 
true if the defendant had raised the issue of fraud in Colorado by 
a special appearance. If it is held that Mr. Zenker has lost the 
opportunity to raise in other states the question of the effect of 
fraud because he had an opportunity to litigate that issue in the 
Colorado proceedings, fraud as a means of vitiating a personal 
service will be greatly curtailed and will exist only insofar as the 
state where the service is had chooses to recognize it.33 
31 It should be pointed out that the apparent reason for Mrs. Zenker's 
desire to serve Mr. Zenker in Colorado was to prevent him from collater-
ally attacking the money judgment in Nebraska because it appears that is 
where the bulk of his property rests. To obtain the divorce decree with-
out a property settlement, only the domicile of Mrs. Zenker in Colorado 
was required. 
32 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 99 (1917). 
33 This result might not be too far from that which Congress intended 
when it passed legislation implementing the full faith and credit clause. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948): "Such ... judicial proceedings ... shall 
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States . . • as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . 
from which they are taken." 
NOTES 467 
The Zenker case suggests another interesting problem. It ap-
pears from other records in the case that the husband possesses 
property in a state other than Nebraska and Colorado. Could 
the plaintiff-wife, after the Nebraska Supreme Court decision be-
comes final, enforce the Colorado judgment in another state, e.g., 
New York, where property 0f the def endant-hus'band migh.t be 
located? Or would New York have to give full faith and credit 
to the Nebraska Supreme Court decision holding the Colorado 
property judgment invalid for lack of jurisdiction over the hus-
band? It appears that the answer to the second question is, "Yes." 
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the Colorado court 
granting the divorce had no jurisdiction to grant either the di-
vorce or the property judgment. Since the jurisdictional issues 
were litigated in Nebraska it would seem the New York court 
would be bound by the Nebrasb, decision. The husband never ap-
peared in the Colorado action although he was personally served. 
The decree and judgment were issued ex parte. When the wife 
tried to register the property judgment in Nebraska the issue of 
jurisdiction of the Colorado court was litigated with both parties, 
husband and wife, before the court, and it was found that Colorado 
did not have jurisdiction. Affirmance of this result by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court may bind courts of other states if the prop-
erty judgment is sought to be enforced elsewhere. 
Another question is the validity of the property judgment in 
Colorado. Other information indicates that property jointly held 
by plaintiff-wife and the defendant-husband in Denver was the 
subject of a Colorado foreclosure action which resulted in $921 
being applied to the property judgment.34 If the divorce was in-
valid, does not the property judgment fall with it, even in Colo-
rado, or would the fact that the Colorado foreclosure action oc-
curred before Nebraska found Colorado had no jurisdiction pre-
clude the Nebraska litigation from affecting the Colorado fore-
closure action? 
Even assuming that Colorado had jurisdiction to render the 
divorce, by reason of plaintiff's Colorado domicile, if the personal 
service is invalid did Colorado have jurisdiction to render a money 
judgment against the defendant? It is submitted that it did not.:m 
Lastly, is the Colorado divorce decree valid in Colorado? 
Since the Nebraska court found the decree invalid, the reasonable 
conclusion is that the Zenkers are husband and wife in Nebraska. 
34 Letter from attorney for l\Irs. Zenker in the Colorado action. 
35 Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1874). 
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But are they divorced in Colorado? It is submitted they are.36 
If either remarried in Nebraska, or Colorado, could they be prose-
cuted under bigamy statutes ?37 And if either died would the 
surviving "spouse" be entitled to share in the estate? 
If the divorce decree is valid in Colorado, but invalid in Ne-
braska, and if all other states are now required to give full faith 
and credit to the Nebraska decision, the result is that Mr. and 
Mrs. Zenker are married in forty-seven states and divorced in 
one. After the Nebraska Supreme Court decision in this case we 
apparently can be certain of one thing (provided no further re-
view of the case is attempted), and that is that Mr. Zenker's prop-
erty in the state of Nebraska has little to fear from the Colorado 
money judgment. Whether property belonging to Mr. Zenker in 
other states rests secure to the same extent has not yet been de-
termined. 
There have been complaints in the past that under existing 
United States Supreme Court pronouncements a man does not 
know whether he has a wife or a lawsuit.38 It appears too that 
in a case like the Zenker case, the husband cannot be certain of 
his net worth because of the unsettled condition of the law per-
taining to property judgments issued as part of divorce litiga-
tion. It is conceivable that a divorce decree might not be en-
titled to recognition in a sister state (e.g. if a valid divorce re-
quires domicile of one spouse and the husband although served, 
has neither appeared nor litigated the issue of domicile), but that 
36 See Sutton v. Lieb, 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951). Although Mr. 
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 
U.S. 226 at p. 270 refers to "the Court's holding that Nevada decrees 
were 'void,' " it is doubtful if the majorty thought that is what the 
Court held. At p. 239 Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the majority states: 
"We conclude that North Carolina was not required to yield her State 
policy because a Nevada court found that petitioners were domiciled in 
Nevada when it granted them decrees of divorce. North Carolina was 
entitled to find, as she did, that they did not acquire domicile in Nevada 
and that the Nevada court was therefore without power to liberate the 
petitioners from amenability to the laws of North Carolina governing do-
mestic relations." In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Murphy at p. 239 
states: "The State of Nevada has unquestioned authority, consistent with 
procedural due process, to grant diTorces on whatever basis it sees fit to 
all who meet its statutory requirements. It is entitled. moreover, to give 
to its divorce decrees absolute and binding finality within the confines of 
its borders." 
37 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-903 (Reissue 1948); Colo. Stats. Ann. c. 40-
9-1 (1953). 
38 See Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in Estin v. Estin, 334 u.s. 541, 
553 (1948). 
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the property judgment incident to the divorce might be entitled 
to recognition (e.g., if it were issued in a divorce proceeding in 
which there was valid personal service on the husband) '? It would 
seem strange indeed to hold that the property judgment, premised 
as it is by the state which grants it upon a valid divorce decree, 
should be entitled to enforcement in a sister state, and at the same 
time hold that the divorce decree is a nullity outside the state of 
rendition. Such a result would split an already "divisible" di-
vorce still another way.39 
Floyd A. Sterns, '57 
39 See, e.g., Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951). 
